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I.  INTRODUCTION 
No longer is it true that a woman who gives birth to a child is that 
child’s biological mother.  The biological mother may well be standing at 
the side of the woman as she gives birth, coaching her lesbian partner 
through the birth of their first child.  In another hospital room, twin boys 
born to a woman may be half-brothers, but not her sons.  Instead, the two 
men standing just outside the birthing room--a gay couple--are each the 
biological father to one of the boys, but the children share a common bio-
logical mother who remains an anonymous egg donor in a gestational sur-
rogacy arrangement.  The medical wonders described above are the result 
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of readily accessible scientific reproductive technologies that continue to 
evolve.1 
Over the past twenty years, these reproductive techniques have not 
only become more accessible, they are also increasingly used by unmarried 
persons and couples to create families that do not conform to society’s tra-
ditional and legal conceptions of “family.”2  The nuclear family of two, 
opposite-sex parents, and their shared biological offspring has been joined 
by families headed by same-sex couples or single parents.3  These scientifi-
cally-spawned, non-traditional families emerged in the wake of a national 
transformation in divorce laws and a relatively rapid evolution in gender 
expectations with respect to work and home, trends that began in the 
1960s.4  Data from the 2000 Census indicates a continuing decline in the 
proportion of American households headed by opposite-sex married couples 
and a corresponding growth in households headed by single women or men, 
and unmarried couples.5  Buried in these statistical trends is a growing 
awareness of a “gayby” boom, an era in which gay men and lesbians, both 
as individuals and as couples, are increasingly choosing to become parents 
and establish families of their own.6  Scientific developments in reproduc-
tive technologies ranging from sperm banks and artificial insemination to in 
                                                    
 
1
 Consider, for example, the development of tri-gametic in-vitro fertilization where the only 
genetic material used in conception is obtained from the eggs of two different women.  The DNA from 
the non-gestational woman is removed from her egg and placed in a sperm casing, which has been 
stripped of its donor’s DNA.  The reconstituted “sperm” is then used to fertilize the gestational mother’s 
egg.  Kyle C. Velte, Egging on Lesbian Maternity:  The Legal Implication of Tri-Gametic In Vitro Fer-
tilization, 7 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 431, 433-34, n. 11 (1999).  There may be some legal 
limits to some reproductive techniques that do not use a sperm cell.  Michelle M. Hausmann, Surrogacy 
and Related Matters, in ADOPTION, PATERNITY, AND OTHER FLORIDA FAMILY PRACTICE §9.19 (The 
Florida Bar, 2007). 
 
2
 See John A. Robertson, Assisted Reproductive Technology and the Family, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 
911, 912 (1996) (discussing various reproductive techniques). 
 
3
 Craig W. Christensen, Legal Ordering of Family Values: The Case of Gay and Lesbian Fami-
lies, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1299, 1331 (1997) (defining the nuclear family). 
 
4
 See generally LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER, GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, MARY LOUISE FELLOWS 
& THOMAS P. GALLANIS, FAMILY PROPERTY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ON WILLS, TRUSTS, AND 
FUTURE INTERESTS 1-4 (4th ed. 2006). 
 
5
 Tavia Simmons & Martin O’Connell, U.S. Census Bureau, Married-Couple and Unmarried-
Partner Households: 2000, (No. CENSR-5) 3 (2001), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/ 
2003pubs/censr-5.pdf.  See also T.P. Gallanis, Inheritance Rights for Domestic Partners, 79 TUL. L. 
REV. 55, 57-59 (2004) (reporting additional census data on unmarried couples). 
 
6
 The earliest use of the term, “gayby boom,” may have appeared in Eloise Salholz et al., The 
Future of Gay America, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 12, 1990, at 20.  See Mary Patricia Byrn, From Right To 
Wrong: A Critique Of The 2000 Uniform Parentage Act, 16 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 163, 209-15 (2007), 
and Melanie B. Jacobs, Micah Has One Mommy And One Legal Stranger: Adjudicating Maternity For 
Nonbiological Lesbian Coparents, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 341, 342 (2002) for statistical references on the 
gayby boom.  While there is no certainty in the numbers of gay men and lesbians raising children, there 
is consensus that the numbers are increasing.  See Lynn D. Wardle, A Critical Analysis of Interstate 
Recognition of Lesbigay Adoptions, 3 AVE MARIA L. REV. 561-63 nn.2-7 (2005) (suggesting that statis-
tics offered by proponents of lesbigay adoptions are inflated while acknowledging dramatic increases in 
numbers). 
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vitro fertilization and gestational surrogacy are making “lesbigay” family 
creation even easier. 
Innovation in family creation may have roots in science, but the impli-
cations for law are especially significant when one recognizes the impor-
tance that family plays in the American legal landscape.  The right to “es-
tablish a home and bring up children” has long been posited as a liberty 
afforded to individuals by the U.S. Constitution under the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments.7  The concept of “family” underpins our legal notions 
of privacy,8 property,9 and inheritance.10  In many states, the law has slowly 
evolved to embrace the modernization of the American family that has re-
sulted from both the societal changes in family relationships as well as ad-
vances in science.11   However, some states continue to resist legal recogni-
tion of non-traditional families by either limiting or simply barring a range 
of family arrangements.12 
Florida is one state that has made family creation particularly difficult 
for gay men and lesbians.  In 1977, the state statutorily banned adoptions by 
                                                    
 
7
 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 398 (1923) (finding that liberty encompasses the right to 
marry, establish a home and bring up children); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) 
(finding parental liberty violated by state law mandating public school attendance).  But see Lofton v. 
Sec’y of Dept. of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004) (finding that familial rights 
only accrue to legally-recognized families). 
 
8
 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (recognizing a right to privacy 
in marital reproductive decisions). 
 
9
 See generally LESLIE JOAN HARRIS, LEE F. TEITELBAUM & JUNE CARBONE, FAMILY LAW 34-
111 (3d ed. 2005). 
 
10
 Consider the range of state laws providing for spousal elections against a will, rights of heirs 
under intestacy statutes, and homestead provisions.  See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 732.201 (2006) (granting 
surviving spouse elective share of decedent’s estate); FLA. STAT. § 732.102-103 (2006) (granting spouse 
and heirs intestate share of estate); and FLA. STAT. § 732.401-403 (2006) (providing spouse and lineal 
descendants protections of homestead property). 
 
11
 See, e.g., Sharon S. v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 554, 571 (Cal. 2003); Adoptions of B.L.V.B. and 
E.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1993); and Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993) (recogniz-
ing second-parent adoptions in cases of lesbian couples using artificial insemination); and In re Jacob, 
660 N.E.2d 397 (N.Y. 1995) (recognizing second-parent adoptions by unmarried partners of biological 
mothers in two cases, one a same-sex partner where child was conceived using artificial insemination, 
and an opposite-sex partner where the child was conceived in previous marriage and biological father 
consented to the adoption).   
 
12
 Examples abound.  Consider the various bans on civil unions and same-sex marriages found in 
state constitutions and state statutes, and in some cases, further language that limits certain rights only to 
married couples.  There are also restrictions on who may adopt and foster parent, limitations on visita-
tion orders, child custody awards, and the regulation or outright prohibition of surrogacy agreements.  
Current data on these policies are readily available from the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, 
Research & Reports, http://www.thetaskforce.org/ reports_and_research.  
In 1996, the national government weighed in on family issues by adopting the Defense of Marriage 
Act, which limits the federal government’s recognition of marriage to a “legal union” between a man 
and a woman as husband and wife, and permits states to deny recognition of marriages performed le-
gally in other states between same-sex couples. Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 
1 U.S.C. § 7, and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C). 
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“homosexuals,”13 and despite numerous legal challenges, the ban remains in 
force.14  This Comment explores how gay men and lesbians in Florida have 
managed to build their families despite the ban, and considers the implica-
tions of these new family structures for Florida’s laws and public policies.  
Following a review of the historical events leading up to Florida’s ban on 
adoptions by homosexuals and subsequent efforts to overturn it, legal ave-
nues of family creation available to lesbigay parents in Florida are de-
scribed.  Potential legal challenges are explored and discussed, drawing on 
litigation in Florida, other states, and federal courts.  Pending legislation 
and avenues for policy change are also considered. 
II.  HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Florida’s statutory ban on adoptions by “homosexuals” has its roots in 
the backlash to what has been described as the third wave of the American 
gay liberation movement.15  In the wake of the Stonewall riots of 1969, gay 
and lesbian interest groups formed in major cities across the country to 
work for legal and political change.16  High on their agenda was ending 
                                                    
 
13
 “Homosexual” is the term employed in the statute, however, the statute failed to define “homo-
sexual.”  FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3) (2006).  As a result, the Florida Supreme Court adopted a conduct-
based definition, rather than an orientation or identity characterization of “homosexual.”  See infra text 
accompanying notes 60-89. 
 
14
 See Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t. of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004); 
Florida Dep’t. of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Cox, 627 So. 2d 1210 (Fla, 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Seebol 
v. Farie, 16 Fla. L. Weekly C52 (16th Cir. Ct. Mar. 15, 1991), reprinted in Florida Dep’t of Health & 
Rehab. Servs. v. Cox, 627 So. 2d at 1221-29. No other state has an outright ban on adoptions by homo-
sexual persons.  Mississippi bars adoption by couples of the same gender, but would permit an adoption 
by a single homosexual.  MISS. CODE. ANN. § 93-17-3(5).  Alabama’s legislature adopted a joint resolu-
tion to express its intent, “to prohibit child adoption by homosexual couples.”  See Code Commis-
sioner’s Notes, ALA. CODE § 26-10A-6 (2006), citing Act 98-439 (HJR 35).  Utah bans adoptions by a 
person who is “cohabiting” with another in a non-marital, sexual relationship, but would apparently not 
bar an adoption by a non-cohabitating, single homosexual.  UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-1(3)(b) (2006).  
Michigan, which permits adoption by one member of a same-sex couple, will not permit adoptions by a 
same-sex couple legally married in another state.  Mich. Op. Att’y. Gen. 7160 (2004), 2004 WL 
2096457.  In 1995, Nebraska’s Department of Social Services barred adoption by individuals “who are 
known by the agency to be homosexual or who are unmarried and living with another adult” by policy 
directive.  Memorandum from Director, Nebraska Department of Social Services on Placement in Foster 
Care to District and Division Administrators, #1-95 (January 23, 1995), available at 
http://www.hhs.state.ne.us/jus/memos/ AM-1.pdf. 
 
15
 The gay and lesbian movement has been described in three eras.  The first period, homosexual 
emancipation, began in the 1890s and lasted until World War II.  The second period, marking the homo-
phile movement, followed the war through the Stonewall Riots of 1969.  The modern era of gay and 
lesbian liberation began in the 1970s and continues today.  MARGARET CRUIKSHANK, THE GAY AND 
LESBIAN MOVEMENT 63 (1992).  On the backlash effect, see JAMES W. BUTTON, BARBARA A. RIENZ 
AND KENNETH WALK, PRIVATE LIVES, PUBLIC CONFLICTS 68-69 (1997). 
 
16
 The Stonewall Riots occurred in New York City at the Stonewall Bar when police officers 
attempted to conduct a vice operation, a form of harassment employed against cross-dressers and gay 
men.  The violence and civil disobedience that resulted lasted several days, and marked the beginning of 
the modern gay liberation era.  See CRUIKSHANK, supra note 15, at 63. 
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discrimination, and gay activists saw some early successes.17  In South Flor-
ida, activists organized and effectively persuaded the Dade County (now, 
Miami-Dade) Commission to adopt a human rights ordinance that would 
have outlawed discrimination in areas like employment, housing, and pri-
vate education.18  Although passed by a 5-3 vote on January 19, 1977, a 
petition drive led by entertainer Anita Bryant secured sufficient signatures 
to force the commission to either repeal the ordinance itself or submit it to 
the electorate for a referendum vote.19  In April, the commission voted to 
put the issue to the voters at a special election in June of that year.20  A bit-
ter, and at times, violent campaign resulted in the repeal of the ordinance by 
better than a two-to-one margin.21 
Despite its local character, the petition drive and high-profile cam-
paign merited state-wide and national attention.  Then-governor Reuben 
Askew spoke out against the ordinance.22  In the state legislature, Senator 
Alan Trask from Winter Haven introduced two bills.23  One amended the 
state’s marriage license laws, requiring that one party be male, and the other 
party be female.24  The other added a single sentence to the adoption laws:  
                                                    
 
17
 Thirty-six cities had adopted non-discrimination ordinances by early 1977.  Adon Taft and 
Susan Burnside, Group Opposes Proposed Metro Law: Gay Anti-Bias Bill Criticized, MIAMI HERALD, 
Jan. 17, 1977, at B1. 
 
18
 Theodore Stanger, Dade Approves Ordinance Banning Bias Against Gays, MIAMI HERALD, 
Jan. 19, 1977, at A1. 
 
19
 John Arnold, Ruvin Swing Vote May Throw Gay-Rights Issue to Voters, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 
17, 1977, at A1. 
 
20
 John Arnold, Dade Will be Gay-Rights Battlefield, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 20, 1977, at A1. 
 
21
 Allan H. Terl, An Essay on the History of Lesbian and Gay Rights in Florida, 24 NOVA L. REV. 
793, 805 (2000).  Some 21 years later, in 1998, Miami-Dade County finally adopted a Human Rights 
Ordinance that bans discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, real or perceived, in housing, 
finance, employment and public accommodations.  Miami-Dade County Ord. No. 98-170, § 1, Dec. 1, 
1998, codified at Chap. 11A, Art. 1, § 11A-1 (2007), available at http://www.municode.com/resources/ 
gateway.asp?pid=10620&sid=9. 
 
22
 Robert Hooker, Askew Would Vote ‘No’ on Gay Rights: Miami Gays Seethe, MIAMI HERALD, 
Apr. 17, 1977, at D2. 
 
23
 Democrat, Winter Haven.  Terl, supra note 21, at 806. 
 
24
 Ch. 77-139, § 1, 1977 Fla. Laws 465 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 741.07 (1977)).  As this Com-
ment is written, Florida faces yet another battle over gay rights.  In January 2008, the Secretary of State 
certified that the requisite signatures had been gathered through the initiative process to place a constitu-
tional amendment on marriage on the November 2008 ballot.  The proposed amendment states, “Inas-
much as marriage is the legal union of only one man and one woman as husband and wife, no other 
legal union that is treated as marriage or the substantial equivalent thereof shall be valid or recognized." 
Cited in Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General Re Florida Marriage Protection Amendment, 926 So. 
2d 1229, 1232 (Fla. 2006).   
If adopted by 60% of the voters, the amendment would effectively impose a constitutional bar on 
Florida’s recognition of out-of-state gay marriages and civil unions, would probably undermine domes-
tic partnerships currently recognized in several counties and municipalities across the state, and may 
even jeopardize some contractual arrangements between unmarried couples, regardless of whether they 
are of opposite sexes or the same sex, according to organizations campaigning against the amendment.  
See, e.g., SAVE-Dade, Marriage Amendment,http://savedade.readyhosting.com/marriage_ 
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“No person eligible to adopt under this statute may adopt, if that person is a 
homosexual.”25  Both bills passed the state legislature and were signed into 
law by Governor Askew two days after the Dade County referendum vote.26 
The adoption ban remained settled law in Florida during the 1980s as 
the state’s gay community recovered from the Dade referendum fight, fo-
cused its attention on the outbreak of AIDS, and sought out allies in its ef-
forts to end discrimination.27  In 1989, the American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU) of Florida made overturning the adoption ban one of its litigation 
priorities and filed the first legal challenge to the law in Monroe County 
(the Florida Keys).28  Ed Seebol, a gay man whose application to adopt was 
rejected by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services because 
he indicated that he was “homosexual,” claimed that the adoption ban was 
unconstitutional under state law.29  The State made no appearance to defend 
against the suit.30  Seebol and the ACLU prevailed when the court ruled that 
the adoption ban violated Seebol’s right to privacy, due process rights, and 
equal protection under both the state and national constitutions.  Because 
the State filed no appeal challenging the trial court’s decision, the statutory 
ban on gay adoptions effectively had no legal force in Monroe County.31 
Following this early success, the ACLU filed a second case in Sarasota 
County on behalf of two gay men who were denied the opportunity to adopt 
                                                    
amendment.htm; Florida Red and Blue, http://www.floridaredandblue.com/; and Fairness for All 
Families-Vote NO Florida, http://www.fairnessforallfamilies.org/. 
 
25
 Ch. 77-140, § 1, 1977 Fla. Laws 466 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 63.042 (1977)). 
 
26
 Id; Ch. 77-139, § 1, 1977 Fla. Laws 465 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 741.04(1) (1977)).  For 
comments by state senators during legislative consideration of § 63.042(3), see Tiffani G. Lee, Case 
Note, Cox v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services: A Challenge to Florida’s Homosexual 
Adoption Ban, 51 U. MIAMI  L. REV. 151, 154-55 (1996) citing Fla. S. Jour., 1977 Org. Sess. at 370-71.  
In 1997, Florida passed legislation that refuses recognition of marriages between persons of the same 
sex and “relationships between persons of the same sex which are treated as marriages . . . for any 
purpose,” and orders all agencies, and political subdivisions to give no effect to any “public act, record, 
or judicial proceeding” of any other political entity “respecting either a marriage or a relationship not 
recognized . . .  or a claim arising from such a marriage or relationship.”  FLA. STAT. § 741.212 (2006).  
The statute has been sustained in a challenge on federal constitutional grounds.  Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. 
Supp. 2d 1298 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (finding that statute did not violate the U.S. Constitution under the Full 
Faith & Credit, Due Process, Equal Protection, Privileges or Immunities, or Commerce Clauses). 
 
27
 See, generally, Terl, supra note 21, at 809-21. 
 
28
 Terl, supra note 21, at 818, 822.  
 
29
 Seebol v. Farie, 16 Fla. L. Weekly C52 (16th Cir. Ct. Mar. 15, 1991), reprinted in Florida Dep’t 
of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Cox, 627 So. 2d 1210, 1221-29 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993). 
 
30
 Id. 
 
31
 Id.  Since the Seebol decision, the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals declared the Florida statute 
constitutional in Lofton v. Secretary of Department of Children and Family Services.  As an interesting 
aside, the 11th Circuit seemingly glossed over the Seebol outcome even while citing it, stating, “To date, 
no attempt to overturn the provision has succeeded.”  358 F.3d 804, 807 (11th Cir. 2004). Because the 
Seebol Court relied on both the Florida Constitution and U.S. Constitution in reaching its privacy, due 
process, and equal protections arguments, there may remain a question as to whether the Lofton Court 
reversed the Seebol decision. 
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a special needs child.32  On summary judgment, the trial court ruled § 
63.142(3) void for vagueness and unconstitutional under Florida’s constitu-
tional right to privacy and equal protection.33  This success was short-lived, 
however, as the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) 
appealed the case.  In an exhaustive opinion, the Second District Court of 
Appeal of Florida reversed the decision on procedural grounds as well as on 
the vagueness, privacy, due process and equal protection issues, and re-
manded the case.34  The ACLU then appealed to the Florida Supreme Court, 
which granted review in Cox v. Florida Department of Health and Rehabili-
tative Services.35  In a per curiam opinion, the Court affirmed the district 
court’s decision as to the procedural, vagueness, privacy and due process 
issues, but ruled that “the record is insufficient to determine that this statute 
can be sustained against an attack as to its constitutional validity on the 
rational-basis standard for equal protection.”36  It directed a remand on the 
equal protection issues only.37  The case ended quietly, however, when the 
petitioners took a voluntary dismissal.38 
In 1995, the ACLU moved forward yet a third case that had been filed 
in 1992, but was stayed pending the outcome in the Cox case.39  June Amer, 
a corrections officer, was not permitted to even apply to adopt a child by 
Florida’s Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services because she 
was a lesbian.40  The ACLU worked to cure the failings of the Cox case by 
building a record that elicited expert testimony from psychologists, pointed 
to the inconsistencies in banning homosexuals from adoption but not from 
foster parenting and noting the fact that Ms. Amer was already parenting a 6 
year-old son, all in an effort to undermine the “rational” basis of the law.41  
Their arguments were not convincing, however, and the trial court sustained 
the statute.42 
                                                    
 
32
 Florida Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Cox, 627 So. 2d 1210, 1212-13 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. 
App. 1993). 
 
33
 Id. 
 
34
 Id. 
 
35
 Cox v. Florida Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs., 637 So. 2d 234 (Fla. 1994) (granting review). 
 
36
 Cox v. Florida Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs., 656 So. 2d 902, 903 (Fla. 1995).  See Lee, 
supra note 26, (providing insights to legislative history of statute and background to case). 
 
37
 Cox, 656 So. 2d at 903. 
 
38
 Terl, supra note 21, at 824. 
 
39
 Id. 
 
40
 Donna Leinwand, Gay Adoption Ban Upheld: Lesbian Loses Her Case Against 1977 State 
Law, MIAMI HERALD, July 29, 1997, at B1. 
 
41
 Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, Trial Opens in Challenge to Florida Adoption 
Law Barring Lesbian Moms and Gay Dads (May 5, 1997), available at 
http://legalminds.lp.findlaw.com/list/queerlaw-edit/msg00656.html.  Policies of Florida’s Department of 
Health and Rehabilitative Services to bar unmarried couples and homosexuals from serving as foster 
parents were struck down in 1994.  Matthews v. Weinberg, 645 So. 2d 487, 490 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 
1994) (finding that the agency had exceeded its delegated rule-making authority). 
 
42
 Amer v. Johnson, 4 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 854b (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct. 1997). 
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Another challenge to Florida’s ban on gay adoptions was filed in fed-
eral court by the ACLU, and it, too, failed to overturn the statute.43  In 
Lofton v. Secretary of the Department of Children and Family Services, the 
11th Circuit Court of Appeals considered the appeal of six plaintiffs who 
challenged Florida’s ban on gay adoptions on federal constitutional issues, 
and had lost on summary judgment.44   The three foster parents, one legal 
guardian, and two of their minor children (one of the foster children and the 
child under guardianship care) made three claims: that the statute violated 
their due process rights to familial privacy, intimate association and family 
integrity; that their fundamental rights to private sexual intimacy as es-
poused by the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas were 
violated;45 and that the statute’s differing treatment of homosexuals under 
law was a transgression of the 14th Amendment’s Equal Protection 
Clause.46  The Court denied each of the claims, holding that foster parents 
and legal guardians do not enjoy the constitutional rights afforded to legal 
parents, and thus, could not claim the rights of family privacy and integrity, 
and intimate association.47  Cabining the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in 
Lawrence, the Lofton Court also posited that the Supreme Court had not 
elevated private adult sexual conduct to a fundamental right, but had merely 
afforded it more protection under the Constitution.48  Finally, the 11th Cir-
cuit panel applied a rational basis test to evaluate the plaintiffs’ equal pro-
tection claims, finding that Florida’s argument that the “best interests of the 
child” would be served by placing children in homes with heterosexual 
parents was not irrational.49  A motion for an en banc hearing, which was 
denied by a divided court (7-5), elicited even more text on the substantive 
                                                    
 
43
 Lofton v. Sec’y Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 
44
 Lofton v. Kearney, 157 F. Supp.2d 1372 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (granting summary judgment to the 
State of Florida), aff’d subnom. Lofton v. Sec’y Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804 (11th 
Cir. 2004).  The original suit also included several other plaintiffs who were dismissed earlier for lack of 
standing.  Lofton v. Butterworth, 93 F. Supp.2d 1343, 1348 (S.D. Fla. 2000) 
 
45
 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 
46
 Lofton, 358 F.3d at 809.  For analyses and potential applications of the Lofton decision, see, 
Elizabeth L. Maurer, Errors that Won’t Happen Twice:  A Constitutional Glance at a Proposed Texas 
Statute That Will Ban Homosexuals From Foster Parent Eligibility, 5 APPALACHIAN J. L. 171, 181-84 
(2006); Christopher D. Jozwiak, Lofton v. Secretary of the Department of Children and Family Services: 
Florida’s Gay Adoption Ban Under Irrational Equal Protection Analysis, 23 LAW & INEQ. 407 (2005); 
and Timothy P. Wasyluka, Homosexuals’ Rights to Adopt After Lofton v. Secretary of Department of 
Children and Family Services, 27 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 635 (2004). 
 
47
 Lofton, 358 F.3d at 809. 
 
48
 Lofton, 358 F.3d at 815-16 (citing Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion and observation that the 
majority had not declared a “fundamental right,” and further noting that the majority had not located the 
right “directly in the Constitution, but instead treated it as the by-product of several different constitu-
tional principles and liberty interests”). 
 
49
 Id. at 821-26. 
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issues of the case than did the decision itself.50  A subsequent petition by the 
plaintiffs for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court was denied.51 
Litigation over Florida’s adoption ban ceased after the Lofton decision 
as advocates for gay families struggled to find other legal vehicles with 
which to challenge the law.  In late 2008, two cases—one in Monroe 
County and the other in Miami-Dade County—challenged the adoption ban 
successfully.52  While the State did not defend the constitutionality of the 
adoption ban, nor did it appeal that court’s order granting the petition to 
adopt in the Monroe County case, the State did make an appearance to de-
fend the adoption ban in the Miami-Dade proceeding.53   
Grounded on distinctive legal theories, the two cases are factually 
similar—prospective fathers sought the adoption of children whom the 
State had placed in their care as foster parents and the children had lived 
with the prospective parent for four or more years.54  The Monroe County 
petitioner grounded his case on two theories accepted by the court:  a) the 
adoption ban is a “special law,” and as such, violates the Florida Constitu-
tion’s prohibition on special laws “pertaining to . . . adoption of persons”;55 
and b) the adoption ban is a bill of attainder, prohibited by both the Florida 
Constitution and the U.S. Constitution.56  The court sua sponte also found 
that the adoption ban violates the Florida Constitution’s separation of pow-
ers doctrine grounded in Article II, Section 3, because the legislature had 
effectively “displaced the inherent authority and concurrent jurisdiction of 
the adoption court” to determine the best interests of the child.57 
The Miami-Dade case, argued by the American Civil Liberties Union, 
rested on substantially different grounds.  This court held that state and fed-
eral law established a child’s right to a permanent home.58  The state’s adop-
tion ban violated the children’s right to permanency as well as their liberty 
interests.59  Furthermore, the court found that the statute violated Florida’s 
constitutional guarantee of equal protection by discriminating against ho-
                                                    
 
50
 Lofton v. Sec’y Dep’t of Children & Family Servs, 377 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2004) (denying 
petition for rehearing en banc). 
 
51
 Lofton v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Children & Families, 543 U.S. 1081 (2005) (denying certiorari). 
 
52
 In the Matter of the Adoption of John Doe, 2008 WL 5070056 (16th Cir. Ct. Aug. 29, 2008) 
(hereinafter “Monroe County case”); In the Matter of the Adoption of John Doe and James Doe, 2008 
WL 5006172 (11th Cir. Ct. Nov. 25, 2008) (hereinafter “Miami-Dade County case”).  
 
53
 At the time of publication, the State had not indicated whether it intends to appeal the ruling. 
 
54
 In the Monroe County case, the petitioner and his partner had previously been named perma-
nent guardians of the child by the court.   
 
55
 Art, III, Sec. 11(a)(16) Fla. Const.; Monroe County Case, 2008 WL 5070056. 
 
56
 Monroe County Case, 2008 WL 5070056 at 22-27. 
 
57
 Id., at 27-33. 
 
58
 Miami-Dade County Case, 2008 WL 5006172, 21-25 (relying on Florida Supreme Court deci-
sions, Florida statutes, and the federal Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (42 U.S.C. § 671)). 
 
59
 Id. 
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mosexuals and against children who are foster-parented by homosexuals.60  
Employing a rational basis standard of review, the court rejected each of the 
three arguments posited by the State as justifications for the adoption ban:  
that the ban promotes the well-being of children,61 minimizes the social 
stigmatization the children may experience,62 and promotes public moral-
ity.63 
These two cases are surely not the final words on Florida’s adoption 
ban.  Lawyers will continue to consider alternate strategies for creating gay 
and lesbian families that work around Florida’s laws, and attempt to effect 
policy change through the legislative process by whittling away at the lan-
guage of the adoption statute.64  But as gay rights organizations achieve 
legal successes in other states, strategies for importing those successes into 
Florida and Florida law, either directly or indirectly, can serve as vehicles 
for the recognition of lesbian and gay family relationships that Florida law 
persistently refuses to acknowledge.65 
III.  CREATING LESBIGAY FAMILIES IN FLORIDA 
The question of “how” to have a legally recognized child is generally 
not an issue for married heterosexual couples.  In Florida, the child of a 
married couple is presumptively assumed to have a mother—the birth 
mother—and a father, her husband, and heterosexual families gain legal 
recognition at their child’s birth.66  But for gay men and lesbian couples 
whose relationships remain legally non-existent in Florida and in most 
                                                    
 
60
 Id., at 25-29. 
 
61
 Id. at 28 
 
62
 Id. 
 
63
 Id. at 29. 
 
64
 A bill that would permit limited adoptions by individuals who are gay or lesbian has been 
introduced for consideration during the 2008 Florida Legislative Session.  The bill would permit adop-
tions by gays or lesbians when the child’s parents are deceased, the prospective adoptive parent is the 
child’s legal guardian, and the child already resides with the prospective parent.  Relating to Adoption, 
S.B. 0200 (similar H.B. 0045), 2008 Fla. Leg. Sess. (Fla. 2007).  State chapters of national gay rights 
organizations and local organizations recognize the importance of educating and reshaping public opin-
ion in Florida, and have mounted campaigns that focus on education and social change.  For a discus-
sion of public opinion on Florida’s adoption ban, see Scott D. Ryan, Laura Bedard & Marc Gertz, Flor-
ida’s Gay Adoption Ban: What Do Floridians Think?, 15 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 261 (2004). 
 
65
 Consider the implications for Florida of a recent decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit, striking down Oklahoma’s Adoption Invalidation Law, and requiring that state to recog-
nize adoption decrees issued by courts outside of Oklahoma even when the adoptive parents are a same-
sex couple.  Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 
66
 “‘Parent’ means a woman who gives birth to a child and a man whose consent to the adoption 
of a child would be required under s. 63.062(1).  If a child has been legally adopted, the term ‘parent’ 
means the adoptive mother or father of the child.”  FLA. STAT. § 39.01(48) (2006).  Florida also defines 
“family” as “a collective body of persons, consisting of a child and a parent, legal custodian, or adult 
relative, in which: (a) The persons reside in the same house or living unit; or (b) The parent, legal custo-
dian, or adult relative has a legal responsibility by blood, marriage, or court order to support or care for 
the child.”  FLA. STAT. § 39.01(30) (2006).   
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states, family creation is the model of family planning and choice.67  The 
first hurdle for them is generally “how” to have a child.  While there are 
gay men and lesbians who are raising children from previous heterosexual 
relationships, for most lesbigay families, family creation in Florida is a two-
step process:  they must first decide on how to have a child and determine 
which adult will be the first parent, and then attempt to gain legal recogni-
tion of the other partner as a second parent.68  In the balance of this Com-
ment, I focus on the first hurdle for childless gay and lesbian singles and 
couples in Florida, how to have a child.69  Depending on the couple’s situa-
tion and the law, three avenues of family-building may be available to pro-
spective gay and lesbian parents:  single-parent adoptions, artificial insemi-
nation, and surrogacy.  
A.  Single-Parent Adoption 
Single-parent adoptions by gay men and lesbians do take place in Flor-
ida despite the statutory ban on adoptions by a “homosexual.”70  These 
adoptions are likely uncontestable in the legal arena for two reasons.  First, 
the state legislature failed to define “homosexual” in crafting the adoption 
statute and courts have relied, instead, on a definition of “homosexual” that 
is both narrow and vague.  Second, once any adoption is approved, Flor-
                                                    
 
67
 Some states have legally recognized the relationships of same-sex couples, and have done so 
through a variety of arrangements.  As of February 2008, Massachusetts was the only state to fully 
recognize same-sex marriage.  California’s Supreme Court heard consolidated oral arguments on March 
4, 2008, in the four cases that grew out of San Francisco’s marriage event in 2003, and the Court is 
expected to render a decision on that state’s same-sex marriages within 90 days.  In re: Marriage Cases, 
149 P.3d 737 (Cal. 2006) (granting review).  Vermont, Connecticut, New Jersey and New Hampshire 
recognize civil unions, while California and Oregon afford domestic partnerships to same-sex couples.  
Maine, Washington and the District of Columbia have limited relationship recognition laws, and Hawaii 
allows for reciprocal beneficiaries.  The National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, Relationship Recogni-
tion for Same-Sex Couples in the U.S. (February 22, 2008), http://www.thetaskforce.org/reports_and_ 
research.  
Other countries have also accorded legal recognition to same-sex relationships.  Marriage, with all 
of the rights accorded to a marital couple, is now permitted in five nations: Netherlands (2001), Belgium 
(2003), Spain (2005), Canada (2005) and South Africa (2006).  Civil unions have a longer history that 
date back to Denmark’s recognition in 1989, and in many cases, these national laws provide registered 
couples with full family rights, including the right to adopt and co-parent.  Norway, Sweden, Iceland and 
Finland extend many of the marital benefits to a same-sex couple through civil unions and domestic 
partnership recognition.   
 
68
 Courtney G. Joslin, The Legal Parentage of Children Born to Same-Sex Couples:  Develop-
ments in the Law, 39 FAM. L. Q. 683 (discussing early gay parenting litigation arising from custody 
disputes between former different-sex spouses). 
 
69
 Subsequent research will examine the second phase of family creation in Florida, specifically, 
gaining legal recognition for the second parent. 
 
70
 Note that Florida law permits an unmarried or single adult to adopt.  FLA. STAT. § 63.042(2)(b) 
(2006). 
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ida’s statute of repose limits who may challenge an adoption, and estab-
lishes a time limit to those contests.71 
1.  “Homosexual” Defined 
The adoption ban statute fails to define “homosexual.”  While a judi-
cially-constructed definition has been adopted and is recognized by most 
Florida courts, it is conduct-based and casts a narrow category of sexual 
acts, it does not encompass sexual orientation, and it leaves an essential 
component of the adopted definition unspecified.  As a result, gay men and 
lesbians can and do, in good faith, deny being “homosexual” under Florida 
law.72   
The State of Florida identifies persons ineligible to adopt under the 
ban by asking them to self-identify as homosexuals or bisexuals on the 
Adoptive Home Application required by the Department of Children and 
Families for all adoptions.73  On the application, Item II(G) reads as fol-
lows: “Section 63.042(3), F.S., states that ‘no person eligible to adopt under 
this statute may adopt if that person is a homosexual.”74  To the right of this 
statement are two items, with check-boxes for “Yes” and “No” answers by 
the potential adoptive parents (Husband [Man]/Wife [Woman]).  The first 
seeks a response to the statement, “I am a homosexual.”  The second item 
seeks a response to the statement, “I am bisexual.”75  The application does 
not provide definitions of homosexual or bisexual.  In each of the cases that 
has been litigated in Florida courts, the petitioners either refused to mark an 
answer but was known to be homosexual,76 proffered to the agency in ad-
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 While there is an on-going debate in the legal academy regarding adoptions by gay, lesbian, 
and transgendered persons, this Comment focuses solely on the legal issues involved in lesbigay parent-
ing.  See, e.g., Carlos A. Ball, The Immorality of Statutory Restrictions on Adoptions by Lesbians and 
Gay Men, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 379 (2007) (examining the immorality of Florida and Oklahoma’s anti-
gay adoption statutes); Lynne Marie Kohm, Moral Realism and the Adoption of Children by Homosexu-
als, 38 NEW ENG. L. REV. 643 (2004) (concluding that it is in the best interests of every child to have a 
mother and father who are married to each other). 
 
72
 Not discussed here, but worthy of recognition, are the personal dilemmas that one confronts in 
openly denying their sexual orientation, regardless of an established legal definition.  The politics and 
personal costs of the closet have been deliberated at length by the gay community.  See, e.g., BRUCE 
BAWER, A PLACE AT THE TABLE 236-254 (Ann Patty ed., Poseidon Press 1993); MICHAEL WARNER, THE 
TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS, AND THE ETHICS OF QUEER LIFE (Harv. Univ. Press 1999). 
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 Florida Dep’t of Children & Families, Adoptive Home Application, CF-FSP 5071 (03/2007). 
 
74
 Id. at 4. 
 
75
 The inclusion of the “bisexual” question supports an interpretation of the ban as a conduct-
based, and not as an identity-based determination.  Note that no challenge has been made to the adoption 
ban by a bisexual even though it is believed that the incidence of bisexuality is greater than homosexual-
ity.  See Kenji Yoshino, The Epistemic Contract of Bisexual Erasure, 52 STAN. L. R. 353 (2000) (arguing 
that despite a greater incidence of bisexuality both homosexuals and heterosexuals benefit from distinct 
orientation classifications that exclude bisexuals and bisexuals have contributed to their own erasure). 
 
76
 That Steven Lofton, one of the plaintiffs in the only federal case to challenge Florida’s adoption 
ban, had refused to answer the homosexuality question on his adoption application became an issue of 
contention for the State in its Motion for Final Summary Judgment.  The State attempted to argue that 
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vance that they were “homosexual,”77 or marked the “Yes” box on the ap-
plication.78   
No case has been challenged before the Florida courts where an appli-
cant denied being a “homosexual” or “bisexual,” and the Department of 
Children and Families disqualified the applicant on its own finding that the 
applicant is, in fact, homosexual or bisexual.  A challenge in such a scenario 
would force the state to further clarify its definition of “homosexual,” and 
require that the state introduce evidence and testimony that goes directly to 
the applicant’s conduct and its currency, evidence that is not so easily at-
tained.  More importantly, such a challenge would point out the serious 
flaws in Florida’s ban on adoptions by homosexuals. 
“Who” is a homosexual was one of several issues at the heart of the 
only adoption ban case to be decided by Florida’s appellate courts.79  In 
Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Cox, Florida’s 
Second District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s finding that the 
adoption-ban provision was unconstitutionally void for vagueness.80  De-
cided in the wake of Bowers v. Hardwick, the United States Supreme Court 
decision that upheld a state’s right to criminalize sodomy,81 the Cox court 
grounded its definition of homosexuality in conduct.82  Because the statute 
fails to define “homosexual,” the court agreed to adopt the state’s argument 
that Florida should rely on a definition used by New Hampshire, the only 
other state with a statutory ban on homosexual adoptions at that time.83  
In New Hampshire, at the urging of its Supreme Court, the state legis-
lature developed a definition of homosexual to be used specifically in the 
                                                    
Lofton, who had been a foster parent for over ten years, was denied permission to adopt because he 
failed to submit a complete application.  The court rejected that argument, calling it “disingenuous in 
light of the explicit language of their Answer and the evidence in the Record.” Lofton v. Kearney, 157 F. 
Supp. 2d 1372, 1375 n.3 (S.D. Fla. 2001).   The 11th Circuit’s opinion notes further that Lofton had also 
refused to disclose “his cohabiting partner” as a member of his household on the adoption application.  
Lofton v. Sec’y Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 808(11th Cir. 2004). 
 
77
 See, e.g., Lofton, 358 F.3d at 808 (discussing Plaintiff Houghton’s disqualification due to ho-
mosexuality as determined during preliminary home study evaluation). 
 
78
 See, e.g., Lofton, 358 F.3d  at 808 (discussing Plaintiffs Smith and Skahen having acknowl-
edged that they were gay men on the adoption application). 
 
79
 The definition of “homosexual” was first considered in Florida Dep’t of Health and Rehab. 
Servs. v. Cox, 627 So. 2d 1210 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).  Upon review, the definition was affirmed 
by the Florida Supreme Court.  Cox v. Florida Dep’t of Health and Rehab. Servs., 656 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 
1995). 
 
80
 The trial court had asked the parties to brief the issue and made this finding despite the fact that 
the petitioners acknowledged they were “homosexual” and had not raised arguments of vagueness or 
over-breadth in their claim.  Florida Dep’t of Health and Rehab. Servs. v. Cox, 627 So. 2d at 1214. 
 
81
 478 U.S. 186 (1986); overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down 
Texas state sodomy law in favor of a liberty interest in private, consensual sex between adults). 
 
82
 Florida Dep’t of Health and Rehab. Servs. v. Cox, 627 So. 2d 1210, 1213-15 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. 
App. 1993). 
 
83
 New Hampshire adopted its statutory ban in 1987, and repealed it in 1999. N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN § 170-B4 (1988). 
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context of that state’s adoption ban.84  A homosexual was “any person who 
performs or submits to any sexual act involving the sex organs of one per-
son and the mouth or anus of another person of the same gender.”85  The 
New Hampshire Supreme Court, in reviewing the statute with its amended 
language, upheld its constitutionality with two caveats:  that the definition 
did not intend to encompass coerced acts, and that “the definition's present 
tense usage to mean that the acts bringing an individual within the defini-
tion's ambit must be or have been committed or submitted to on a current 
basis reasonably close in time to the filing of an application for licensure or 
a petition for adoption.”86 
In adopting the New Hampshire definition, the Florida court in Cox 
noted that the state agency in charge of adoptions submitted that it would 
only bar adoptions “when it knows of current, voluntary homosexual activ-
ity by an applicant.”87  The Cox Court thus found the definition of a homo-
sexual to be reasonable, and that it concerned a person’s conduct and not 
their thoughts or orientation.88  Finally, the Cox Court also concluded that 
the Florida legislature was not required to use “precise anatomical language 
in order for a person of common understanding and intelligence to appreci-
ate that homosexual activity intended by the Florida statute is the same as 
that described in the New Hampshire statute.”89  This approach was subse-
quently affirmed on review by the Florida Supreme Court.90  Five years 
                                                    
 
84
 New Hampshire permits judicial review of legislation prior to enactment at the request of the 
legislature.  When the New Hampshire legislature first referred the proposed legislation banning homo-
sexual adoptions, the Court “requested to be excused from giving an opinion” until the legislature pro-
vided a definition of “homosexual” and provided a “statement of factual findings about the nexus be-
tween homosexuality as the legislature would define it and the unfitness of homosexuals as declared by 
the bill.”  Opinion of the Justices, 522 A.2d 989 (N.H. 1987).  Of particular relevance was the court’s 
discussion of possible definitions: 
While “homosexual” is understood generally to refer to a person who sexually prefers another of his 
or her own sex, the court does not know how broadly or narrowly the House of Representatives would 
desire that definition to be applied in administering the statute. For example, should “homosexual” be 
limited to those currently engaging in physical homosexual practices, should it apply to any person who 
has ever at any time engaged in such a practice or could it apply to a person who considers himself or 
herself to be a homosexual but who has never performed a homosexual act? Should homosexual prac-
tices include any form of sexual contact, as defined in RSA 632-A:1, IV, or should “sexual penetration,” 
as defined in RSA 632-A:1, V, be required? Should “homosexual” refer to a bisexual person?  522 A.2d 
at 990.  The Court subsequently rendered a full review of the proposed statute after the legislature in-
cluded a definition of “homosexual.”  Opinion of the Justices, 530 A.2d 21, 24 (N.H. 1987).     
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 N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 170-B:2 (1991). 
 
86
 Opinion of the Justices, 530 A.2d 21, 24 (N.H. 1987).  The court further explained, “This 
interpretation thus excludes from the definition of homosexual those persons who, for example, had one 
homosexual experience during adolescence, but who now engage in exclusively heterosexual behavior.” 
Id. 
 
87
 Florida Dep’t of Health and Rehab. Servs. v. Cox, 627 So. 2d 1210, 1214 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. 
App. 1993). 
 
88
 Id. 
 
89
 Id. at 1214-15. 
 
90
 Cox v. Florida Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs., 656 So. 2d 902, 903 (Fla. 1995). 
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later, in the only federal challenge to Florida’s adoption ban, the Lofton 
plaintiffs failed to challenge the statute as vague or overly broad, a point 
noted by the District Court in granting summary judgment for the state.91 
Despite Florida’s adoption of New Hampshire’s statutory language, the 
answer to the question of who is a “homosexual” under Florida state law 
remains a murky one.92  One point of contention goes to the nature of the 
sexual activity adopted from the now-repealed New Hampshire law.93  By 
crafting an anatomically-specific statute, the definition fails to recognize a 
broad range of sexual activities engaged in by gay men and lesbians that are 
not included in the New Hampshire criteria.94  A gay couple could avoid the 
classification of “homosexual” by simply not engaging in the specific for-
bidden acts.95  A second shortcoming of the judicially-constructed definition 
is its failure to define what constitutes “current” homosexual activity.  In 
grappling with this issue in its advisory opinion, the New Hampshire Su-
preme Court gave a single example of what it would not consider current 
homosexual conduct, but that court did not attempt to interpret “currency.”96  
Is abstinence from engaging in the forbidden acts for a day, a week, a 
month, or a year sufficient to overcome the “currency” criteria? 
Finally, the state faces a certain difficulty in establishing that an appli-
cant has lied on his or her application, or that the applicant has engaged in 
current homosexual activity without the state crossing the threshold of the 
applicant’s bed chambers at an indiscrete moment.  If an applicant truthfully 
denies the “I am a homosexual” query, the agency may have a difficult time 
making a determination as to the homosexual conduct of the applicant.  
Even if neighbors, friends and colleagues interviewed during the adoption 
process all acknowledge that the applicant has a “homosexual orientation,” 
none are likely to have the knowledge of explicit sexual practices required 
by the definition.  The Second District Court of Appeal recognized that it 
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 Lofton v. Kearney, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1374 n.2 (S.D. Fla. 2001). 
 
92
 Beyond the scope of this Comment is the scholarly conversation about identity construction 
and classificatory authority, especially with respect to race, gender and sexual relationships.  By defin-
ing homosexuality strictly as conduct, the State may have avoided embroiling itself in the debate over 
sexual orientation and homosexual behavior.  See, e.g.,  Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 169 
(2002) (challenging the traditional legal identity paradigm through gay practices of conversion, passing 
and covering); M.C. Mirow, Kennewick Man, Identity, and the Failure of Forensic History, in HISTORY 
IN COURT: HISTORICAL EXPERTISE AND METHODS IN A FORENSIC CONTEXT 241, 264 (Alain Wijffels, 
ed., Studia Forensia Historica No.3, 2001) (recognizing legislative role in constructing legal identities 
even when they are “inconsistent with identities based on other references”); Mary Coombs, Interrogat-
ing Identity, 11 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 222, 230-38 (1996) (reviewing JUDY SCALES-TRENT, NOTES 
OF A WHITE BLACK WOMAN: RACE, COLOR, COMMUNITY, (1995)). 
 
93
 See supra note 71. 
 
94
 This is especially true in an era of “safe sex” where many couples, gay and straight, specifically 
avoid the possible exchange of bodily fluids. 
 
95
 For example, the use of sex “toys” and manual manipulation between same-sex partners do not 
constitute homosexual conduct under the Florida statute. 
 
96
 See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
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was working with a narrow definition in its decision in Cox, stating, “We 
recognize that a definition of “homosexual,” limited to applicants who are 
known to engage in current, voluntary homosexual activity, draws a distinc-
tion between homosexual orientation and homosexual activity.”97  It did, 
however, signal the legislature that the elected body had the power to ex-
pand the definition “without any mandate from this court.”98 
While a strict definition of “homosexual” rooted in current conduct 
may be recognized and upheld in a judicial arena, what happens “in the 
field” at the hands of social workers assigned to conduct home surveys may 
result in the application of a definition of “homosexual” that cuts more 
closely to homosexual orientation than homosexual conduct.  Florida law 
requires that a petition to adopt be accompanied by the results of a favor-
able preliminary home study.99  Conducted by a licensed child-placement 
agency, a registered child-care agency, a licensed professional or state 
agency, the home study is based on interviews with the prospective parents, 
criminal background and abuse registry checks, verification of the adoptive 
parents’ financial security, “an assessment of the physical environment of 
the home,” and documentation of counseling on the adoption process, adop-
tive parenting, and support services.100  The “Family Safety and Preserva-
tion Program” of the Department of Children and Family Services requires 
that the home study consider a litany of factors including five written rec-
ommendations, and it requires prospective parents to sign an affidavit of 
good moral character, attesting to their own good moral character.101 
While a prospective gay parent may deny being a current practicing 
homosexual, the home study can undoubtedly raise questions in the evalua-
tor’s mind that could result in an unfavorable home study.  A single man 
who is too effeminate or a woman who is too masculine may be perceived 
by the social worker, correctly or even incorrectly, as homosexual.  Two 
unrelated adult women or men cohabitating may be treated by the review-
ing agency as “homosexual,” regardless of the applicant’s negative response 
on the application.  Or the prospective parent may be asked outright about 
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 Florida Dep’t of Health and Rehab. Servs. v. Cox, 627 So. 2d 1210, 1215 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. 
App. 1993).  The court also limited its decision to the facts at hand:  “We do not need to determine what 
steps HRS would be entitled to take in the best interests of children if an applicant declined to answer 
these questions.”  627 So. 2d at 1217. 
 
98
 Id. at 1215 (stating that the “legislature is constitutionally permitted to reach its own conclu-
sions on the validity of the distinction between homosexual orientation and activity without any mandate 
from this court.”) 
 
99
 FLA. STAT. § 63.112(2)(B) (2006). 
 
100
 FLA. STAT. § 63.092(3) (2006). 
 
101
 FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. R. 65c-16.005(3)(m) (2003).  The affidavit serves as the affiant’s 
acknowledgement or denial that the affiant has been found guilty or entered a plea of nolo contendere to 
a list of criminal charges ranging from murder to child abuse to sexual misconduct.  Florida Department 
of Children and Families, Affidavit of Good Moral Character, Form 1649 (2007), available at 
http://www.dcf.state.fl.us/DCFForms/Search/DCFFormSearch.aspx. 
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living arrangements.  For example, consider the facts in a foster care case 
where, during the home study and survey of the placement home, the pro-
spective parent was asked if her female roommate “slept in the same bed-
room.”
102
  If the answer is “yes,” the social worker will probably assume 
that they engage in homosexual conduct, even if they do not.   
While not rejecting the application on the basis of “homosexual con-
duct,” agency supervisors may also reject applicants using other grounds as 
a cover for their own perception that the applicant meets the state’s defini-
tion of homosexual.  When this happens, applicants may have little recourse 
in appealing the state’s finding.  Because adoption in Florida is a statutory 
privilege and not a fundamental right, the state enjoys wide discretion in its 
placement decisions.  Add to this discretion the state’s reliance on determin-
ing what is in the best interests of children, and a “very substantial state 
interest” is recognized by the courts that may be difficult to rebut by even 
misidentified heterosexuals.103 
2.  Statute of Repose  
A prospective gay or lesbian parent, who in good faith denies current 
homosexual conduct and is subsequently approved for a placement, enjoys 
the same legal protections following the adoption afforded to other adoptive 
parents.  Florida law provides all adoptive parents with an assurance that 
the court orders establishing their legal status are final one year after the 
adoption judgment.  State law subjects adoption orders to an independent 
statute of repose.104  For gay and lesbian parents, the statute can serve as an 
effective legal tool in rebutting future challenges to their adoption orders.  
The legislative and legal history of the statute of repose suggests that the 
law establishes a fairly substantial bar against any proceedings to unsettle 
an adoption order after the one-year period, even if a petitioner alleges 
fraud on issues other than the requisite consent to adopt.  Moreover, the law 
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 When she replied that they did, the Health and Rehabilitative Services official asked her if they 
were homosexuals; the prospective parent’s truthful response resulted in an unfavorable home study.  
The state statute, however, does not forbid gays and lesbians from becoming foster parents.  Matthews v. 
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imposes strict limits on “who” may challenge adoption orders regardless of 
when that challenge is filed. 
Historically, Florida courts have reversed adoption orders that were 
gained through fraud on the biological mother.105  The statute of repose, 
adopted in a modernization of Florida’s adoption laws in 1973, cured pro-
cedural defects and irregularities in adoption orders, and provided that any 
“direct or collateral attack” on the validity of the judgment was barred, even 
as to the issue of consent to the termination of parental rights, if the matter 
could have been cured during the adoption proceedings. 106  Courts, how-
ever, read “irregularity” narrowly and continued to permit claims based on 
fraud to be raised beyond the time limits set by the statute of repose.107   In 
2000, the legislature revised the statute to specifically address claims based 
on fraud.108   Retaining the one-year limitation for all procedural challenges, 
it established a new two-year limitation for fraud claims.109  In effect, the 
statutory revision limited judicial discretion by prohibiting courts from con-
sidering stale claims of fraud as grounds for reversing adoption orders. 
The most recent amendment to the statute eliminated any mention of 
claims based on fraud.  Included in the Florida Adoption Act of 2003, the 
current statute of repose bars “an action or proceeding of any kind to vacate, 
set aside or otherwise nullify” an adoption order filed more than one year 
after entry of the judgment “on any ground” (emphasis added).110  However, 
this does not foreclose claims by persons whose consent to an adoption are 
required by the adoption laws.  Under Florida Statute s. 63.082(4)(b) 
(2006), a consent “may be withdrawn only if the court finds that it was ob-
tained by fraud or duress.”  Other claims of fraud, however, are barred one 
year after the execution of the adoption order.111 
What may be even more important for gay and lesbian families is that 
the recent amendment to the statute of repose added a section that limits 
who may challenge adoption orders, regardless as to the timing of those 
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 See, e.g., In re adoption of Shea, 86 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 1956) (affirming existence of fraud suffi-
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proceedings.112  A party seeking to challenge a judgment of adoption, other 
than those entitled to notice in accordance with the general adoption stat-
ute,113 must establish an interest that is “direct, financial, and immediate, 
and the person must show that he or she will gain or lose by the direct legal 
operation and effect of the judgment.”114  An interest that is “indirect, incon-
sequential or contingent” is not sufficient to establish standing to challenge 
an adoption order.115  Thus, challenges by interest groups opposed to gay 
adoptions and disapproving family members who seek to unsettle the adop-
tion should be barred simply because they have no standing. 
Problematic, however, is the possibility that a court would permit an 
adopted child to challenge her own adoption by and through a guardian ad 
litem or “next friend.”  Although not arising in the context of gay parents, 
such a case was considered in Peregood v. Cosmides, where a two-year old 
child filed a petition to vacate and rescind a final judgment of adoption.116  
In this case, the natural parents had entered into a creative legal agreement 
whereby the father would be relieved of his child support payments in re-
turn for foregoing future visitation rights with the child.117  To effect the 
agreement, the natural parents each consented to terminating their parental 
rights over their son and making him available for adoption.  The mother 
then adopted her son as sole parent.118   Shortly after the adoption was final-
ized, the deal began to unravel when it became clear that the mother could 
not financially sustain herself and the child.  As a result, suit was brought in 
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the child’s name against both of his parents, “through his best friend, his 
maternal grandmother,” challenging the final judgment of adoption.119  
While the court recognized that the child had standing to challenge his 
adoption, it limited its opinion to the “unusual facts surrounding this case, 
and that this opinion is to be narrowly construed.”120 
Florida’s ban on homosexual adoptions can be legitimately avoided by 
prospective gay and lesbian parents if they understand how the state has 
defined “homosexual,” and that the definition is limited to specific acts 
engaged in “currently” rather than an orientation or preference.  But be-
cause the statement that the state asks prospective parents to answer on their 
adoption applications is framed so bluntly and fails to provide any defini-
tion of “homosexual” or “bisexual,” prospective parents must be counseled 
as to the definition, and advised that no court has interpreted what would be 
considered “current” homosexual activity.  Further legal challenges to the 
deceptive wording of the adoption application or a suit where the state has 
denied an adoption application based on the adoption ban to a prospective 
parent who denied being a homosexual may be the only avenues left in a 
future round of legal challenges. 
B.  Artificial Insemination 
Lesbian couples and single women generally enjoy both a biological 
and legal advantage over gay men when it comes to family creation in that 
they can start their families by artificial insemination.  One woman agrees 
to serve as the biological and natural mother of the child, and is inseminated 
with donor sperm.121  With much planning and a little luck, she will become 
pregnant and bear a child who is her natural child.  Florida law provides 
that “the donor of any egg, sperm, or preembryo, other than the commis-
sioning couple or a father who has executed a preplanned adoption agree-
ment under s. 63.212, shall relinquish all maternal or paternal rights and 
obligations with respect to the donation or the resulting children.”122  As a 
result, a child conceived by artificial insemination and born to an unmarried 
woman will only have its birth mother named on the Florida birth certifi-
cate.123  This is particularly important to the lesbian couple who may later 
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 The distinction between a biological and natural mother is an important one in reproductive 
technology cases, and is at the heart of surrogacy disputes.  The biological parent is one who is geneti-
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 FLA. STAT. § 742.14 (2006). 
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 “If the mother is not married at the time of birth, the name of the father may not be entered on 
the birth certificate without the execution of an affidavit signed by both the mother and the person to be 
named as the father.” FLA. STAT. § 382.013(2)(c) (2006). 
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seek to add a second name to the birth certificate of their Florida-born 
child.124 
The issue of sperm donation and paternity claims has been addressed 
by Florida’s appellate courts.  In Lamaritata v. Lucas, a man brought a pa-
ternity suit to establish himself as the father of twins born as a result of arti-
ficial insemination.125  On appeal, the man claimed that he was not a sperm 
donor under Florida law,126 and that he and the birth mother were a “com-
missioning couple,” and therefore, he was exempted from the statute.127  
The court rejected his arguments.  While recognizing that “sperm donor” is 
not defined in the statute, the court noted that the contract called him a “do-
nor” and “that sperm is the only donation required of him.”128  The court 
also rejected his suggestion that the birth mother and he constituted a com-
missioning couple, defined by the statute as “the intended mother and father 
of a child who will be conceived by means of assisted technology using the 
eggs or sperm of at least one of the intended parents.”129   As the couple had 
only agreed to the donation of sperm for artificial insemination and had not 
agreed to jointly raise the children, they did not constitute a commissioning 
couple.130  The court ruled that, “[a] person who provides sperm for a 
woman to conceive a child by artificial insemination is not a parent. . . .  If 
the sperm donor has no parental rights, the sperm donor is a nonparent, a 
statutory stranger to the children.”131 
In Budnick v. Silverman, an unmarried woman entered into a “Precon-
ception Agreement” with a man in which they agreed to have intercourse 
for the purpose of conceiving a child.132  The terms of the arrangement 
stated that the woman would be sole custodian of the child and pay for all 
expenses; she would not identify him as the biological father nor initiate a 
paternity action against him.133  She further agreed that if she violated the 
agreement, he could seek “full and complete and permanent custody and 
guardianship of the child.”134  A child was conceived as a result of the rela-
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tionship.135  When the child was ten years old, the mother filed a Petition for 
Determination of Paternity naming the “donor” man, claiming the agree-
ment was not cognizable under Florida law, and that it was against public 
policy.136  The trial court granted summary judgment for the man, and the 
mother appealed.  The reviewing court refused to recognize the man as a 
sperm donor under Florida law, reasoning that the law was created as part 
of a section on “reproductive technology,” and that “[i]mpregnation by the 
‘usual and customary manner’ has been around long enough so that it does 
not constitute ‘reproductive technology.’”137  In Budnick and in a subsequent 
case in Florida, the biological fathers of children conceived through inter-
course were ordered to pay retroactive child support as of the child’s 
birth.138 
In Florida, the legally-optimal scenario for a lesbian who desires to 
become a natural or biological mother is to seek out the services of a medi-
cal provider versed in both the medical and legal issues surrounding artifi-
cial insemination.139  Whether the sperm used is an anonymous donation 
from a bank or from a known contributor like a friend, acquaintance, or 
relative of the couple,140 a medical provider can serve as a witness to the 
fact that the child was conceived through artificial insemination and not 
through the “usual and customary manner.”141  Working through a sperm 
bank or medical provider also reduces the possibility that the resulting 
childbirth would be challenged by the sperm donor in a paternity action 
because the donor would have completed the requisite forms acknowledg-
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ing his role only as donor and foregoing any claims to paternity.142  Some 
lesbian couples opt for nonprofessional (home-based) artificial insemina-
tion using the sperm of friends, acquaintances or relatives; however, a con-
tract that has been reviewed by legal counsel is in the best interest of the 
couple in order to forestall any success by future paternity claims.143    
While some lesbian couples may choose to engage in natural copula-
tion with a willing man, the cooperating man is not a “sperm donor” under 
Florida law, and the lesbian mother runs the risk that the biological father 
will claim paternity under Florida law.144  While Florida’s birth registration 
laws do not permit a birth mother to identify a father on a child’s birth cer-
tificate if she is unmarried, 145 the statute does allow unmarried biological 
fathers the right to notice, and to consent to adoptions of their offspring if 
they file with the Florida Putative Father Registry.146  A paternity claim or 
putative father registration can complicate prospective adoption proceed-
ings, whether those proceedings are in Florida or another state.  The lesbian 
mother will be required to notice the biological father and gain his consent 
to any future adoption, requiring that the putative father formally terminate 
his parental rights to the child.  Thus, prospective lesbian parents should 
only opt for artificial insemination, whether the sperm comes from a known 
or unknown donor, and should be encouraged to employ the services of a 
medical provider who can document that the pregnancy was artificially 
induced. 
Because gay and lesbian relationships have not been recognized by the 
state of Florida, many couples have attempted to rely on the law of con-
tracts to construct family relationships that parallel a heterosexual family.147  
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This has been especially true with respect to lesbian relationships in which 
the couple together decides to engage in family creation using artificial 
insemination.  However, contractual agreements cannot govern child cus-
tody arrangements in Florida.  Consider the case where two women, Mary 
Wakeman (an attorney) and Dené Dixon, eight years into their relationship, 
jointly entered into an agreement with a sperm donor.148  The contract iden-
tifies both women as recipient, mother and co-parent, and the donor surren-
ders all parental rights to the women.  The language of the contract suggests 
that both women were inseminated.  More importantly, it provided that 
Wakeman and Dixon intended to co-parent any children resulting from the 
insemination, and that should one of them pre-decease the other or become 
unable to care for the child, that the child should remain with the other 
woman.   
Only Dixon became pregnant.  Following the child’s birth, the women 
entered into an agreement in which they acknowledged that the decision to 
have a child was a joint decision, that Wakeman agreed to financially sup-
port the child, and that extensively described Wakeman’s relationship with 
the child as one of a de facto parent who maintained a psychological parent-
ing relationship with the child.  The agreement also foretold of the possibil-
ity that the couple would dissolve their relationship at some point in the 
future, and expressed their mutual intent to jointly share in raising the child 
even in that event.149 
Two years later, Dixon again became pregnant through artificial in-
semination and using a similar donor agreement.  Following that birth, an-
other co-parenting agreement was signed by the women.150  In addition to 
the agreements, Dixon and Wakeman executed a domestic partnership, 
which permitted Wakeman to put Dixon and the two children on her health 
insurance policy.151 Wakeman was also designated as the pre-need guardian 
of the children, had authority to make medical and dental decisions, and 
was the named health care surrogate and attorney for Dixon.152  Despite 
these multiple formal arrangements, when their relationship ended after 
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nearly 15 years, Dixon refused to honor any of her commitments and re-
fused to allow Wakeman to share in the children’s lives.153 
Wakeman’s efforts to enforce the agreements before the Florida courts 
failed because Florida’s courts claim not to possess the “authority to compel 
visitation between a child and a person who is not a parent.”154  In Beagle v. 
Beagle, the Florida Supreme Court ruled that grandparents are third parties 
who cannot enjoy child visitation rights with minor children “absent evi-
dence of a demonstrable harm to the child.”155  This threshold places an 
even greater burden on the non-parental party seeking visitation than the 
“best interests of the child.”  Because the state may not interfere with the 
constitutionally-protected privacy interests of a parent unless it can estab-
lish a compelling interest, the non-parental party --be they a grandparent, 
relative, or lesbian co-parent -- must show that “a substantial risk of signifi-
cant harm to the child exists.”156  This is a nearly-insurmountable burden 
that is unlikely to be met when a parent is considered “fit” by even the most 
minimal standard; it demands, in essence, a dependency hearing.  Thus, 
claims by non-parents to being a child’s de facto parent, a co-parent, a psy-
chological parent, and even a claim that the child will be psychologically 
damaged by severing ties to the non-parent will fail in Florida courts.  Non-
parents can only hope that their ex-partner, the child’s biological parent, 
will honor her agreements and act in the best interests of their children.157 
The increasing incidences of gay family dissolutions involving chil-
dren, prompted one judge in the Wakeman case to call on the state legisla-
ture to “address the needs of the children born into or raised in these non-
traditional households when a break-up occurs.”158  Focusing on the needs 
of the children and the growing number of women using assisted reproduc-
tion, Judge Van Nortwick argues that the dissolution of a gay family can be 
just as damaging to a child as the dissolution of a marital relationship.159  
His petition, however, has fallen on deaf legislative ears. 
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While lesbians enjoy the benefits of a womb and the possibility of car-
rying their own child to birth, biology has placed gay men at a great disad-
vantage in parenting as they must rely on the good will of women who are, 
first, willing to carry their children through to child birth, and second, to 
either surrender the children to the father’s sole custody or share custody of 
the children.160  For gay men who live in a state where adoption may be 
foreclosed to them, the services of a surrogate may be the only avenue to 
family building. 
C.  Surrogacy 
Surrogacy provides yet another method by which gay men and lesbi-
ans may start their families.  At its most basic, surrogacy is simply a service 
in which a woman agrees to carry a child to term on behalf of someone 
else.161  Two types of surrogacy arrangements are possible:  traditional and 
gestational.  In a traditional surrogacy agreement, the birth mother agrees to 
be artificially inseminated with the sperm of a man who desires to father a 
child.  The surrogate provides not only her womb, but also her egg, and is, 
thus, biologically related to the child.  The surrogate agrees to surrender the 
child following its birth to the biological father and to voluntarily terminate 
her own parental rights.  Gestational surrogacy is quite different in that the 
surrogate has no biological connection to the child.  The birth mother 
agrees to carry to term an embryo that is conceived outside the womb using 
the egg of another woman, and to surrender the child following birth to the 
contracting parents, who may or may not be related to the child.  Gesta-
tional surrogacy is the most common surrogacy method employed in the 
United States today.162 
Surrogacy came onto the national legal landscape in the late 1980s, in 
the case of In re Baby M, a highly-publicized New Jersey case that declared 
surrogate contracts illegal in that state. 163  Baby Melissa was conceived and 
born as a result of a traditional surrogacy arrangement; the surrogate 
mother, a married woman, entered into a contract to be artificially insemi-
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nated with sperm from a married man, and agreed to surrender the baby 
upon birth to the natural father and his wife.164  When the surrogate refused 
to surrender the child to the natural father and his wife and ultimately fled 
the state with the child, the case became the focus of national media atten-
tion.  Apprehended in Florida, the child and surrogate were returned to New 
Jersey where a protracted legal battle found its way to the Supreme Court of 
New Jersey.  That court refused to recognize and enforce the surrogacy 
agreement, noting that such contracts went against the public policy of the 
state.165  A mother could not contract away or sell her rights to a child.166  In 
the end, the court took a Solomonic approach, awarding custody of Baby M 
to the natural father with visitation by the natural mother, who retained her 
parental rights.167  The intended mother was awarded no legal recognition 
by the court.168 
The facts of this particular case prompted state legislatures and na-
tional lawmakers to recognize the growing vacuum in reproductive tech-
nology policy that was resulting from the increased use of surrogates in 
family creation. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws (NCCUSL) responded to the Baby M case in late 1988, with the 
Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act (USCACA).169  The 
Act offered state legislatures two options:  prohibit surrogacy outright, or 
allow it under stringent regulations.170  While the Act failed to get much 
attention from the states, the NCCUSL subsequently included surrogacy in 
the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) of 2000, and limited surrogacy arrange-
ments to married couples.171  That restriction was eliminated in the 2002 
revision of the UPA.172  Today, about one-third of the states have any legis-
lation on surrogacy, and that ranges from outright prohibition to strict regu-
lation.173 
Florida addressed traditional surrogacy in 1988, calling it “pre-planned 
adoption” and enacting it within the scope of the state’s adoption statute.174  
Five years later, in 1993, the state adopted legislation regulating gestational 
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surrogacy.175  Provisions for gestational surrogacy appear in Florida’s stat-
utes on “Determination of Parentage.”  While surrogacy laws have simply 
not been litigated in Florida’s courts, there is an open question as to whether 
gestational surrogacy, the optimal avenue of reproduction for gay men, is 
available to anyone other than married couples in Florida.  For gay men, 
surrogacy is typically the only means of fathering a child who is genetically 
their own.  While lesbians might also employ the services of a surrogate, it 
is more likely that they would use artificial insemination as a family-
creation strategy, if at all possible.176 
1.  Traditional Surrogacy 
Traditional surrogacy is treated under the rubric of pre-planned adop-
tions in Florida even though no “adoption” actually takes place when the 
intended father (gay or heterosexual) is both the sperm donor and biological 
father, and there is no “intended mother.”177  In a traditional surrogacy, an 
agreement is crafted between a “volunteer mother” and an intended parent 
(or parents), the volunteer is inseminated, and carries the resulting fetus to 
birth.  Following birth, the surrogate voluntarily terminates her parental 
rights and responsibilities in favor of the intended parent.178  Florida law 
requires that these preplanned adoption agreements include specific ac-
knowledgements by the parties that include the statutory requirements that 
either party can terminate the agreement at any time, that the “volunteer 
mother” has the right to rescind the agreement within 48 hours after birth, 
that the “volunteer mother” will assume paternal rights if the agreement is 
terminated, and that an intended father, who is also the biological father, 
assumes full parental rights for the child even if the agreement is termi-
nated.179  That either party can terminate the agreement prior to birth, and 
that the surrogate can rescind the agreement up to 48 hours following birth, 
imposes a heightened risk for all parties to a pre-planned adoption or tradi-
tional surrogacy. 
Notably, the pre-planned adoption agreement seems to embrace the 
fact that a single person – male or female – can enter into a traditional sur-
rogacy agreement with the volunteer mother.  The introductory language 
refers to “individuals” entering an agreement, and the definitions include 
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“intended father” and “intended mother” without any indication that there 
must be one of each or even that if there is an intended mother and father, 
that they be a married couple.  Furthermore, the statutory definitions of an 
intended father and intended mother specifically note that a biological rela-
tionship to the child is not required.180  Thus, the preplanned adoption 
agreement could encompass an arrangement wherein a woman agrees to be 
artificially inseminated by sperm from an unknown donor, and upon the 
child’s birth, voluntarily terminates her parental rights in favor of a single 
man, a single woman, or a married or unmarried couple.181   
On its face, the statute permits gay men and lesbians to employ tradi-
tional surrogacy as a method of family creation.  But preplanned adoption 
agreements are not optimal for gay men and lesbians in Florida.  First, pre-
planned adoption arrangements are subject to review and approval by a 
court, and “compliance with other applicable provisions of law.”182  In the 
case of a preplanned adoption agreement in which the intended parent is not 
biologically related to the child, the adoption is clearly subject to the statu-
tory ban on homosexual adoptions.183 
The statutory language that directly addresses the rights and responsi-
bilities of “the intended father who is also the biological father” suggests 
that the preplanned adoption arrangement may be subject to court approval 
“pursuant to the Adoption Act,” the Act which also includes the homosexual 
adoption ban.184  However, this provision is directly at odds with Florida 
law governing unmarried biological fathers and general paternity claims.185  
A gay man who is biologically related to a child born to a surrogate and 
who entered into a preplanned adoption agreement is not “adopting” the 
child.  In fact, the parentage statute specifically excludes fathers who have 
executed a preplanned adoption agreement from the provision that requires 
sperm donors to relinquish their parental rights and responsibilities.186  
Given that the intended father is the biological father, entitled to recognition 
under Florida law as the father of the child, to refer to court approval and 
the Adoption Act appears incongruous.  A gay man, biologically the father 
of a child born to a surrogate, must merely assert his paternity to be recog-
                                                    
 
180
 FLA. STAT. § 62.213(6)(d-e) (2006). 
 
181
 Nothing in the language of the statute requires that the intended parents of a preplanned adop-
tion agreement be married.  FLA. STAT. § 63.213 (2006). 
 
182
 FLA. STAT. § 63.213(1)(a) (2006). 
 
183
 FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3) (2006). 
 
184
 “That an intended father who is also the biological father acknowledges that he is aware that he 
will assume parental rights and responsibilities . . . if the agreement is terminated . . . or if the planned 
adoption is not approved by the court pursuant to the Florida Adoption Act.”  FLA. STAT. § 63.213(2)(d) 
(2006). 
 
185
 FLA. STAT. §§ 63.053-054 (2006); FLA. STAT. § 742.011 (2006). 
 
186
 FLA. STAT. § 742.14 (2006). 
502 FIU Law Review [4:473 
nized as a father under Florida law.  The ban on homosexual adoptions in 
this case has little relevance. 
Traditional surrogacy arrangements are typically avoided by the gay 
community for other, more significant reasons.187  The risks involved in a 
traditional surrogacy arrangement can be more costly than just the monetary 
arrangements outlined in the preplanned adoption agreement, especially to 
gay men.  Consider a volunteer surrogate who changes her mind and de-
cides to keep the child; she can burden the biological father with child sup-
port payments and an unwanted relationship (with the surrogate mother) for 
18 or more years.  As she is both the birth mother and the biological mother, 
her legal rights to the child are on par with those of the biological father, 
and given courts’ propensity to award child custody to mothers over fathers, 
she may be awarded primary custody.   
Because traditional surrogacy is fraught with legal complications 
rooted in the biological nexus between the surrogate and child, gestational 
surrogacy is a safer alternative for most people seeking to create a family, 
be they gay, lesbian or heterosexual.188 This may be true even in the face of 
serious legal questions regarding the enforceability of such contracts for 
unmarried couples and single persons under Florida law. 
2.  Gestational Surrogacy 
A gestational surrogacy arrangement is one in which the surrogate be-
comes pregnant through the implantation of an embryo, which resulted 
from the in vitro fertilization of a donor egg and sperm.189  The surrogate 
carries and births the child, and then surrenders the child to the contractual 
parents, who usually have genetic ties to the child.190  The surrogate, as a 
party to a contract, simply provides a service -- carrying a child through 
birth -- to the other contracting party.  She has no genetic connection to the 
child whom she has birthed.  As in traditional surrogacy, Florida law per-
mits the surrogate to be compensated for all “living, legal, medical, psycho-
logical and psychiatric expenses” related to the pregnancy.191  However, 
unlike traditional surrogacy, the contracting parties do not have a right to 
unilaterally terminate their agreement, and custody immediately transfers 
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from the surrogate upon birth.192  Moreover, an affirmation of parental 
status can be obtained from the courts within three days after birth and it 
does not follow traditional adoption processes.193  The only provision that 
potentially grants the surrogate parental rights and responsibilities would 
come into effect if the child is not genetically related to the intended par-
ents.194  For these reasons, gestational surrogacy is the optimal of the two 
surrogacy arrangements.  One national infertility organization has estimated 
that 95 percent of all surrogacy contracts today are gestational.195 
Problematic for gay men and lesbians, however, is that Florida’s gesta-
tional surrogacy statute is written such that gestational surrogacy contracts 
are available only to married couples.196 
(1) Prior to engaging in gestational surrogacy, a binding and enforce-
able contract shall be made between the commissioning couple and 
the gestational surrogate.  A contract for gestational surrogacy shall 
not be binding and enforceable unless the gestational surrogate is 18 
years of age or older and the commissioning couple are legally mar-
ried and are both 18 years of age or older.197 
A commissioning couple is defined as the “intended mother and father 
of a child who will be conceived by means of assisted reproductive tech-
nology using the eggs or sperm of at least one of the intended parents.”198  
Additional provisions in the statute require that the commissioning couple 
may only enter a gestational surrogacy contract when, “within reasonable 
medical certainty” as certified by a physician, the intended mother cannot 
carry a child to term, would be at physical risk should she become pregnant, 
or that a pregnancy would risk the health of the fetus.199  Because Florida’s 
gestational surrogacy statute was enacted in the early 1990s, it has not 
benefited from any of the reforms urged by the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws with the revisions to the Uniform 
Parentage Act.  Instead, Florida’s statute is rooted in the now-defunct Uni-
                                                    
 
192
 FLA. STAT. § 742.15(3)(d-e) (2006). 
 
193
 FLA. STAT. § 742.16(1) (2006). 
 
194
 FLA. STAT. § 742.15(3)(e) (2006).  Generally, surrogates contractually agree to refrain from 
normal sexual relations during implantation efforts in order to minimize the possibility that the preg-
nancy and child carried to term is the surrogate’s biological offspring and not the developed implanted 
embryo. 
 
195
 Sanger, supra note 151, at notes 43, 56 (citing Fact Sheet 56: Surrogacy (Gestational Carrier) 
RESOLVE: THE NATIONAL INFERTILITY ASSOCIATION, at 2 (2004)). 
 
196
 For a discussion of the heterosexual-only marriage movement’s influence on both adoption and 
assisted reproduction techniques, such as surrogacy, see Richard F. Storrow, Rescuing Children from the 
Marriage Movement:  The Case Against Marital Status Discrimination in Adoption and Assisted Repro-
duction, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 305 (2006). 
 
197
 FLA. STAT. § 742.14(1) (2006). 
 
198
 FLA. STAT. § 742.13(2) (2006). 
 
199
 FLA. STAT. § 742.15(2) (2006). 
504 FIU Law Review [4:473 
form Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act, passed in the wake of 
the Baby M case.200 
The Florida statute is textually clear that a contract for gestational sur-
rogacy will not be enforced if a married couple is not a party to it.  Thus, a 
contract between a surrogate and a single man, a single woman, or an un-
married couple, regardless of sexual orientation, would not be “binding or 
enforceable” in a Florida court in the event that one of the parties fails to 
perform under the contract.  However, there are unmarried Floridians, espe-
cially gay men, who have virtually no other avenues for family building, 
who are intent on becoming parents, and are willing to risk the unenforce-
ability of a gestational contract to do so.  As long as all parties believe the 
contract is enforceable and no one defaults, little attention will be given by 
a court to the surrogate’s voluntary termination of parental rights, and the 
declaration of parentage of the intended father.  What a Florida court will 
do in the event of a default on a gestational surrogacy contract is the more 
interesting legal question. 
a.  Gestational Surrogacy Contractual Defaults: Whither the Law? 
Determining the parentage of a child conceived through gestational 
surrogacy when there is a contractual default may, at first glance, look 
much like a contractual default over the sale of a car or piece of real estate, 
but it is significantly different given the fundamental interests and rights not 
only of the contractual parties, but of the child.  Declaring a contract void, 
ab initio, cannot relieve the court from its duty to resolve disputed parent-
age issues stemming from a gestational surrogacy.  If a gestational surrogate 
defaults and the contract is void, the court must fall back on statutory prin-
ciples of parentage to determine not only the identity of the mother and 
father, but to make custody and support decisions.  Such a dispute would be 
one of first impression in Florida; there are no reported cases involving 
defaults by gestational surrogates in this state.201   
The legal issues central to a surrogacy dispute, especially in gesta-
tional surrogacy cases, are not the same as those found at the heart of child 
custody disputes.202  Custody battles generally involve parties who are both 
the legal and natural parents of a child, equal before the law with regard to 
their rights and responsibilities to the child.203  These questions are resolved 
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by determining which parent should retain custody by applying a “best in-
terests of the child” standard.204  Gestational surrogacy disputes may require 
the answer to a preliminary and more fundamental question, “Who is the 
parent?”  
Courts typically employ one of three tests, or a combination thereof, to 
determine parentage in surrogacy cases: the intent of the parties, the genet-
ics of the parents and child, or the identity of the birthing parent.205  The 
California Supreme Court employed the intent-of-the-parties approach in 
the seminal case of Johnson v. Calvert, finding that the intended mother and 
father were both the natural and legal parents of a child born using their egg 
and sperm, and rejecting the surrogate’s maternal claim based on birth.206 
The Johnson approach was subsequently applied in In re Marriage of Buz-
zanca, a California case in which neither of the intended parents nor the 
surrogate mother were genetically related to a child who was conceived 
through the donation of both anonymous eggs and sperm.207  Rather than a 
dispute between the surrogate and the intended parents, Buzzanca involved 
the divorce of the intended parents.  The intended father denied paternity 
and the intended mother sought child support from her soon-to-be ex-
husband.208  Rejecting the trial court’s finding that the child had no lawful 
parents, the Buzzanca Court ruled that the intended parents were the lawful 
parents even though they were not genetically related to the child.209 
Employing a different approach, an Ohio court relied on genetics over 
birth and intent.  In ruling that the natural (and intended) parents were the 
legal parents, the court left open the possibility that a claim by the birth 
mother would be upheld only if the natural parents disclaimed the child and 
the surrogate desired the child.210  Other courts also focus on genetics and 
gestation, holding that the genetic connection to a child is of paramount 
importance in determining legal maternity.211  In J.R. v Utah, a federal court 
declared unconstitutional Utah’s surrogacy law, which was designed to dis-
courage surrogacy arrangements by mandating that a surrogate mother is 
the only legal mother recognized under state law.212  The court found that 
Utah’s statutorily-based refusal to recognize the natural parents as the legal 
parents of their own child, born through a surrogacy arrangement, violated 
the fundamental rights of the intended and natural parents to procreate.213 
                                                    
 
204
 . L.J. HARRIS, L. E. TEITELBAUM & J. CARBONE, FAMILY LAW 622-60(2005). 
 
205
 Campbell, supra note 202, at 567; L. H. Dietz, Parent and Child, 59 AM. JUR. 2D §3 (2007). 
 
206
 Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 787 (1993). 
 
207
 In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 61 Cal. App. 4th 1410 (4th Dist. 1998). 
 
208
 Id. at 1412. 
 
209
 Id. 
 
210
 Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760 (Ohio Com. Pl. 1994). 
 
211
 See, e.g., Culliton v. Beth Israel Deaconess Med. Ctr., 756 N.E.2d 1133 (Mass. 2001). 
 
212
 J.R. v. Utah, 261 F. Supp. 2d 1268 (D. Utah 2002). 
 
213
 Id. at 1290. 
506 FIU Law Review [4:473 
 How a gay man or any person other than a married commissioning cou-
ple would fare in a dispute with a gestational surrogate in Florida depends, 
in large part, on how the court would approach its analysis of parentage, 
which provisions of Florida law it would favor, and the degree to which the 
surrogacy contract serves an evidentiary function in the proceedings.  It 
would also depend on the manner in which the case is presented to the 
court:  as a claim by an intended and natural single parent, as an issue in a 
divorce action, or even as a petition by a surrogate who, although biologi-
cally unrelated to the child, seeks judicial relief from maternal responsibili-
ties due to a default by a natural parent.  Establishing paternity and dis-
establishing maternity would be core to any decisions an intended gay par-
ent. 
b.  Establishing Paternity 
The most probable litigation scenario in Florida would be sparked by a 
gestational surrogate’s unwillingness to surrender physical control of the 
child, prompting the intended father to file suit to establish paternity and 
seek custody.  Thus, the first issue for the court, absent the unenforceable 
surrogacy contract, would be to identify the child’s father.  How a Florida 
court approaches paternity may vary depending upon whether the surrogate 
is married at the time of the child’s birth.214  Florida’s parentage laws pro-
vide that if the mother is married at the time of a child’s birth, her husband 
is presumptively the father of the child, “unless paternity has been deter-
mined otherwise by a court of competent jurisdiction.”215  When a married 
woman gives birth, Florida law requires her husband to be named as the 
father on the child’s birth certificate.216  This presumption of marital father-
hood is “one of the strongest rebuttable presumptions known to the law,” 
but it is rebuttable by either the husband or the wife’s paramour.217 
State law also establishes an irrebuttable presumption that a child con-
ceived within wedlock by artificial or in vitro insemination, by a donated 
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egg, or by preembryo is the child of the husband and wife, “provided that 
both parties have consented in writing” to the reproductive technology 
used, except in the case of gestational surrogacy.218  If the contract of gesta-
tional surrogacy is void and unenforceable, the gestational-surrogacy ex-
ception to the irrebuttable presumption should not be recognized by the 
court.  However, it is common practice in gestational surrogacy arrange-
ments to require husbands of married surrogates to sign a separate denial of 
consent to the reproductive technique in order to affirmatively void the irre-
buttable presumption that the resulting child is conceived by the married 
couple.219  In the event that a gestational surrogacy arrangement soured in 
Florida, the husband’s written denial of consent independent of the surro-
gacy contract and standing alone, should provide evidence sufficient to un-
dermine the irrebuttable presumption in favor of the husband, allowing the 
natural or biological father to advance his paternity interests against the 
surrogate’s husband now-rebuttable presumption that he is the father of the 
child. 
Florida law allows “any man who has reason to believe that he is the 
father of a child” to bring an action in circuit court to determine paternity.220 
The state, ever interested in securing child support from putative fathers, 
also welcomes affidavits and voluntary acknowledgments of fatherhood.221  
Thus, a father in a failed gestational surrogacy arrangement could simply 
file an affidavit or voluntarily acknowledge paternity.  If the surrogate dis-
putes his fatherhood, as she may under Florida law, state law provides that a 
court may, on its own motion, order scientific testing of the mother, child, 
and any alleged fathers to establish paternity.222  Courts may also order sci-
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entific testing at the request of a party who provides a sworn statement or 
written declaration alleging paternity “setting forth facts establishing a rea-
sonable possibility of the requisite sexual contact between the parties.”223  
This latter provision provides little force to the intended father in a gesta-
tional surrogacy arrangement as he cannot substantiate “the requisite sexual 
contact” between the parties.   
Also problematic for the intended father in a failed gestational surro-
gacy arrangement is a statutory provision that might treat the intended fa-
ther as nothing more than a sperm donor with no rights to the child.  Florida 
Statute s. 742.14 states that the “donor of any . . . sperm . . . other than the 
commissioning couple or a father who has executed a preplanned adoption 
agreement under s. 63.212, shall relinquish all maternal or paternal rights 
and obligations with respect to the donation or the resulting children.”224  A 
Florida court might cut off the intended father’s paternity claim, reasoning 
that without the contract the father is merely a sperm donor, much like the 
biological father in Lamaritata v. Lucas.225  
In Lamaritata, the court ruled that the biological father was not a par-
ent and rejected his claim that he and the biological mother were a commis-
sioning couple under Florida’s gestational surrogacy statute.226  In that case, 
however, the biological father had signed a contract agreeing that if child-
birth resulted, he would have no parental rights or obligations.  He affirma-
tively surrendered his parental rights; thus, the biological father was more 
like a sperm donor than an intended father.  Of note in the Lamaritata deci-
sion is the court’s recognition that the statute fails to define “sperm donor.”  
Relying on the text of the contract, which refers to the biological father only 
as a “donor,” and sperm as “the only donation required of him,” and the 
state statute, the court concludes that the biological father is only a sperm 
donor and not a parent.227   
Whether a court would come to a similar conclusion in the case of an 
unenforceable surrogacy contract depends on whether the court would be 
willing to distinguish the affirmative waiver of parental rights by the sperm 
donor in Lamaritata from the biological father’s intent to parent as evi-
denced — albeit, not enforced – by the surrogacy contract and, the surro-
gate’s husband’s denial of consent, in the case of a married surrogate.  A 
court that accepts this distinction would be likely to permit the intended 
father to substantiate his paternity through scientific testing.228  But gaining 
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paternal recognition would be only half of the battle for an intended parent 
facing an unenforceable surrogacy contract.  The other half of the fight 
would be to deny the surrogate any rights or recognition as the child’s 
mother, and this may be the more difficult hurdle for a gay father. 
c.  Dis-establishing Maternity 
Historically, parentage questions raised only paternity issues—who is 
the father?   Florida’s law, like those of many states, has not evolved to con-
sider the possibility that a child born to a woman may not be that woman’s 
biological offspring.  Florida does not even define “mother” in its parentage 
statutes.229  In fact, the clearest statement of Florida’s view on maternity 
dates back to 1934, when the Florida Supreme Court found, “A wife is not 
permitted to deny the parentage of children born during wedlock.  She can-
not repudiate their legitimacy.  That right belongs only to the father, be-
cause maternity is never uncertain.  She may only contest the identity of the 
child.”230  Florida law does not address the status of the mother nor does it 
explicitly establish that there is a presumption --rebuttable or irrebuttable -- 
that the birth mother is the legal mother of a child.  However, public records 
laws mandate that a record of live birth or birth certificate “must be as to 
the child’s birth parents unless and until an application for a new birth re-
cord is made” under the adoption statute.231 
An unanswered question in this situation is whether a court would 
even entertain proceedings to determine “maternity” when there is no ques-
tion that an identifiable woman gave birth to the child in question.  While 
Florida law addresses assumptions of parentage with regard to married cou-
ples, that a child born to during marriage is presumed to be the child of both 
the mother and father, it does not explicitly make a presumption that a child 
born to a woman is that woman’s child.  But Florida law requires that in-
formation on a birth certificate be given as to the child’s “birth parents” 
(even if there is a pending adoption), which may further complicate future 
proceedings to have the surrogate removed as the child’s mother.232  Finally, 
Florida law specifically provides only for paternity proceedings; it makes 
no mention in any statute of determinations of motherhood.   
Whether a court would read the jurisdictional statute that charges cir-
cuit courts with making paternity determinations as granting jurisdiction 
over maternity issues depends largely on the reading of the individual judge 
to whom the case is assigned.  A strict reading of the law would forestall 
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nearly every challenge to maternity in Florida.  The statute permits only 
three parties to bring paternity proceedings:  1) a woman who is pregnant or 
has a child, 2) any man who has reason to believe that he is the father of a 
child, or 3) any child.233  The statute also defines when paternity proceed-
ings may be brought as “when paternity has not been established by law or 
otherwise.”234  A court may find that a man simply cannot use the law to 
challenge the legal interests of a woman who, although not genetically re-
lated to the child, is the only identifiable woman that could serve as a 
“mother” to the child even if the natural father has already established his 
paternity.  A court might also take a more liberal approach, recognizing that 
the law is outmoded and finding that the fundamental rights of a parent—
the father—are at risk.  Based on that reasoning, and armed with evidence 
in the form of the gestational contract that strongly suggests that the surro-
gate is not the mother of the child, a court may entertain a maternity pro-
ceeding and require a woman to establish her genetic relationship to the 
child. 
The legal culture of Florida suggests, however, that courts are more 
likely to read a statute strictly, and rule in a manner that favors the “tradi-
tional” family, even in the face of non-traditional circumstances.  If the egg 
donor is identifiable, a Florida court may be more willing to grant parentage 
to the biological parents of the child because a traditional family would 
exist.  However, if the egg donor is anonymous and the natural father is a 
gay man, public policy preferences would likely result in the Baby M com-
promise.  The surrogate, even though genetically unrelated, would be iden-
tified as the mother along with the natural father and a custody determina-
tion would ensue.  The result would look more like a preplanned adoption 
or traditional surrogacy.  Ultimately, a Florida court would like rely on a 
“best interests of the child” standard and insure that a child has both a 
mother and father. 
The manner in which a gestational surrogacy case reaches the court 
will also determine the type of analysis a Florida court might use.  In Ten-
nessee, an unmarried couple decided to begin a family. 235 Using the eggs of 
an anonymous donor and the sperm of the intended father, the pre-embryos 
were implanted in the surrogate who was also the intended mother.  She 
gave birth to triplets and when the unmarried couple’s relationship dis-
solved, the birth mother/surrogate brought a paternity action against the 
natural father.  His defense rested on the fact that the birth mother was not 
the genetic parent and therefore, not the legal parent with standing to file 
the paternity action.  The Tennessee Supreme Court recognized that their 
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state laws simply did not “contemplate many of the scenarios made possible 
by recent developments in reproductive technology.”236  The court rejected 
the natural father’s argument, finding that the birth mother was the legal 
parent and awarding custody to both the natural father and legal mother, 
with the mother having primary custody.237 
This discussion of gestational surrogacy suggests that lesbians and gay 
men who enter into nonbinding and unenforceable gestational surrogacy 
contracts in Florida should consider several actions to protect their interests 
in the child.  First, the potential for disputes over paternity are exacerbated 
when the surrogate is married.  Intended parents would be best served in 
seeking out an unmarried and experienced surrogate.238  Second, an in-
tended father should establish paternity as soon as the pregnancy is con-
firmed by filing an affidavit acknowledging paternity under Florida Statute 
s. 742.10(1) (2006).  In doing so, any challenge to the intended father’s 
claim closes sixty days after the affidavit is filed, which is well before the 
child is born.239  Blood tests in utero can also provide early evidence of pa-
ternity that may support a declaration of paternity even before the child is 
born.   
In order to avoid a court declaration that the intended father is merely 
a sperm donor under Florida law, the intended father may want to supple-
ment the gestational surrogacy contract with a preplanned adoption agree-
ment, which would be recognized under Florida law.  While the preplanned 
adoption agreement would place the gay father back into the predicament of 
possibly sharing custody of his child with the surrogate, not having the 
agreement could result in a finding that the father is merely a sperm donor 
entitled to no rights under law.   
Finally, the intended parents would be well-served by seeking scien-
tific paternity and maternity testing of the fetus as early in the pregnancy as 
safely possible.  Results that show that the surrogate is not the natural 
mother may later serve to persuade an open-minded court that the surrogate 
does not have standing to challenge paternity and to claim custody.  They 
may also serve as the basis for a pre-birth finding of paternity and mater-
nity.  Ultimately, the existence of the results might just simply dissuade the 
surrogate from contesting the agreement. 
In sum, a gay man or lesbian takes risks in entering into a gestational 
surrogacy contract in that it will likely prove unenforceable in state court.  
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On balance, however, the risks might be less than in a traditional surrogacy 
or preplanned adoption agreement in Florida.  When gestational surrogacy 
arrangements are done, prospective parents are well-advised to work 
closely with legal counsel who have experience in this specialized practice 
and to select a gestational surrogate who is experienced and known to be 
reliable. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
This Comment has closely examined the three major ways in which 
gays and lesbians in Florida can become parents within the contours of 
Florida law: adoption, artificial insemination and surrogacy.  But as the 
historical backdrop to Florida’s adoption ban suggests, there is great resis-
tance by both politicians and the courts to embrace the liberalization of 
“family” in Florida. Roadblocks against lesbigay parenting in Florida are 
likely to remain on the public agenda until the ban on “homosexual” adop-
tions is reversed either by the state legislature or by the courts.  Some in the 
state legislature have unsuccessfully introduced legislation to modify or 
reverse the ban.240  For example, legislation introduced in anticipation of the 
2008 Florida legislative session would permit adoptions by gay men and 
lesbians in very limited circumstances.241  Specifically, the bill would lift the 
blanket ban on adoptions and permit adoptions by gays and lesbians when a 
court finds by clear and convincing evidence that a child, who must have 
resided with the person seeking to adopt, recognizes that person as the 
child’s parent and the adoption serves the best interest of the child. 242 A 
lesbigay adoption could also be granted if the person seeking to adopt had 
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been named as guardian of a minor child by the child’s deceased parents, 
and if the last surviving parent had expressed an intention through petition 
under Florida’s standby guardianship statute,243 recorded declaration under 
the state’s preneed guardianship law,244 or by will or codicil that the guard-
ian be eligible to adopt.245 
Such a weakening in the adoption ban may establish the “irrationality” 
necessary to mount an effective equal protection challenge under state law.  
For now, however, the old nursery rhyme, “[f]irst comes love, then comes 
marriage, then comes Mary pushing a baby carriage,” does not describe the 
lives of gay men and lesbians in Florida.  While love certainly comes first 
in contemporary gay relationships, it is likely to be followed by the baby 
carriage with the hope, that someday in the future their relationships will be 
fully recognized by the state.  Lesbigay parenting may ultimately transform 
public thinking on gay marriage as issues that gave rise to the common law 
structures of property and intestacy find their way in American courts in the 
context of lesbigay family matters.  If the best interests of the child truly 
remain at the core of Florida’s legal values, a child who is the son or daugh-
ter of gay men or lesbians deserves nothing less than the children of hetero-
sexual couples. 
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